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Stultitia and Type 2 Diabetes: The Madness of Not Wanting to Care for the Self 
Anders Kruse Ljungdalh, Aarhus University 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper explores the condition of stultitia, which is described by Michel Fou-
cault in The Hermeneutics of the Subject as a condition one is in, before having started to care for 
the self.  The purpose is to shed light on one of the paradoxes of patient education by introduc-
ing and elaborating an aspect of Foucault’s literary activities, which has not, to my knowledge, 
been investigated empirically before.  To illustrate this condition, the paper targets the relation 
between type 2 diabetes, contemporary norms of healthy living, diabetes education, and the 
situation that sometimes occurs when individuals are not capable of, or motivated to, taking 
care of themselves.  It specifically targets a situation, which is both incomprehensible to health 
professionals and patients alike; when patients desire a healthy life, but at the same time do 
not pursue it according to the recommendations.  Thus, it is a condition of madness, which is 
investigated; madness in the sense that patients have internalised a rationality, against which 
their own behaviour rebels. 
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Contemporary Health Norms, Lifestyle Disease, and Madness 
It is commonly held that people, predominantly in the Western World live longer and suffer 
from diseases that are caused by unhealthy lives.  Thus, lifestyle diseases have become a 
health political and economic burden to society, wherefore patients and citizens are increas-
ingly encouraged to manage their health by, for instance following current dietary health 
norms.  No doubt the ideas of risk and susceptibility1 play an important role in transferring 
responsibility from a State level to an individual level.2  Type 2 diabetes is often mentioned as 
a serious disease that has reached ‘epidemic proportions.’3  Moreover, there is an affinity be-
                                                 
1 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 84. 
2 Christopher Ziguras, Self-Care – Embodiment, Personal Autonomy, and the Shaping of Health Consciousness 
(London: Routledge, 2004). 
3 Marideli C. Scanlan & Lawrence Blonde, “Adherence to Practice Guidelines for People with Diabetes Melli-
tus,” in Mark N. Feinglos & M. Angelyn Bethel (eds.), Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus – An Evidence-Based Approach to 
Practical Management (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 2008), 235-249. 
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tween the recommendations given to diabetics4 and the more general, common advice in pub-
lic health policies.5  Eat food rich on fibre, polyunsaturated fat, quit smoking, lead an active life 
and use alcohol in moderation. 
The contemporary, ubiquitous, moral imperative that everybody should live healthily 
is not only expressed by health authorities, but through the media, through company policies6 
and by people in general.  The existence of such a moral imperative is not a controversial 
claim, but the degree to which the health recommendations are presented, and the ways in 
which they are perceived, may be a matter of dispute.  It is not the purpose of this paper to 
describe these differences, conflicts, or disputes.  Others have done that with great insight.7  It 
is rather a central claim that there is a common norm of healthy living, regardless of the fact 
that norms are always multifaceted and contested.   
This study focuses on the lack of self-care among diabetics, on the condition one is in 
before having started to apply the technical and practical changes that are necessary for prac-
ticing a healthy life.  People who do not exercise the responsibility demanded, who do not 
take proper care of themselves, appear, vis-à-vis the public moral imperative mentioned 
above, unmotivated, ignorant, in denial, unaware, incapable, unable or careless.  Their actions 
seem mad to others, and sometimes to themselves as well.  Why would someone not want to 
take care of the self?  The paper takes as its point of departure this seeming madness, and 
analyses the concept stultitia found in Foucault’s lectures Hermeneutics of the Subject8 from 
1981-82, using experiences from an empirical study of diabetes education to illustrate the po-
tential of this concept for empirical research.  Although mentioned briefly in various Foucault-
inspired literature,9 this aspect of Foucault’s work has not been applied in empirical work be-
fore, nor has it been the primary target of analysis when others have analysed Foucault’s late 
works on the Stoics, practices of the self, ascetics, self-transformation, or subjectivity.  An ob-
vious reason is that the concept is only a parenthetical remark in the lectures mentioned above 
that Foucault uses to link these late lectures with his early work on the History of Madness.10 
However, the purpose of the paper is to explore and discuss its potential, and to illustrate the 
implications for further theoretical and empirical research.  The paper therefore diverts from 
                                                 
4 Leslie A. Consitt, Kristen E. Boyle & Joseph A. Houmard, “Exercise as an Effective Treatment for Type 2 
Diabetes,” in Mark N. Feinglos & M. Angelyn Bethel (eds.), Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus – An Evidence-Based Ap-
proach to Practical Management (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 2008), 135-150. 
5 Lars T. Larsen, ‘The Truth Will Set You Free’ – A Genealogy of Public Health Policy in Denmark and the United 
States, 1975-2005, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University 2005. 
6 Nanna Mik-Meyer, “Managing fat bodies: Identity regulation between public and private domains,” Criti-
cal Social Studies, vol. 2, (2008), 20-35. 
7 See for example Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (New York: Zone Books, 1998 [1943/ 
1966]); Uffe J. Jensen, Sygdomsbegreber i praksis: Det kliniske arbejdes filosofi og videnskabsteori (Copenhagen: 
Munksgaard 1983); and Annemarie Mol, “Lived Reality and the Multiplicity of Norms: A Critical Tribute to 
George Canguilhem,” Economy and Society, vol. 27, no. 2-3 (1998), 274-284. 
8 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, edited by Frédéric Gros, 
translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
9 For example in Michael V. Ure, “Senecan Moods: Foucault and Nietzsche on the Art of the Self,” Foucault 
Studies vol. 4, (2007), 19-52.  See page 47 and 51 for a connection between self-transformation and stultitia. 
10 Michel Foucault, The History of Madness (London: Routledge, 2006 [1961/1972]). 
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conventional social science because the primary target of the analysis is not the empirical find-
ings, but rather the concept stultitia in Foucault’s lectures.  The empirical data is used to illus-
trate the utility of this concept, and how it could be used in for example social science focus-
sing on health and illness. 
 
An Introduction to Type 2 Diabetes Education and the Empirical Field11 
One of the major problems in diabetes care, as reported by diabetics as well as health profes-
sionals, is the fact that diabetes patients often feel normal—they do not necessarily experience 
any bodily discomfort or displeasure the first ten to fifteen years.12  Therefore it is difficult for 
them to think of themselves as ill, although they know they have a disease.  In the case of dia-
betes, the meaning of Réne Leriche’s claim that ‘health is life in the silence of the organs’13 is 
broadened.  This is the reason why diabetes health education is a struggle to ‘make aware,’ to 
fight bad habits, and the self-denial and neglect of the diabetics. 
Most type 2 diabetics struggle with obesity, high cholesterol levels, hypertension, late 
complications that follow from these conditions, and subsequently an increased need for med-
ication.14  Certain characteristics are statistically traceable in diabetes—for example, the influ-
ence of variables such as age, gender, number of years with diabetes, and weight.  People with 
diabetes differ in terms of jobs, careers, lifestyle, norms, and values, and therefore manage 
their illness in different ways.  Type 2 diabetes was formerly known as ‘old man’s diabetes’ 
[Danish ‘gammelmandssukkersyge’], because, typically, old or elderly people developed what 
was understood as a mild form of diabetes.  When type 2 diabetes was discovered it was re-
garded primarily as a geriatric disease—with old age come changes in the metabolism that can 
cause the average glucose level to rise.15  Within the last thirty years, however, type 2 diabetes 
has increasingly, and quite strongly, been associated with lifestyle choices and bad habits, and 
people are younger when they develop this condition.  This is presumably to do with the 
changes on the labour market from physical work to service jobs. 
The institutional side of the diabetes field that I have investigated empirically, should 
be explained carefully.  The hospital, located on the outskirts of Copenhagen, Denmark, coop-
erates with the local municipality about developing appropriate offers of health promotion 
and education.  The municipality and the hospital have jointly applied for project funding 
concerning type 2 diabetes, which involves one month of diabetes school, a two months exer-
                                                 
11 The article is based on one specific aspect of my Ph.D. dissertation Patho-Epistemology: An investigation of 
contemporary lifestyle norms through type 2 diabetes self-care practices and techniques of life (Copenhagen: The 
Danish School of Education – Aarhus University, 2012).  Some passages have been taken from the disserta-
tion and re-composed or changed to fit the style of the journal. 
12 Annemarie Mol, The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice (London: Routledge, 2008), 26. 
13 Quoted in Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, 91, in Nikolas Rose, The psychological complex. Psy-
chology, politics and society in England, 1869-1939 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 228, and in Rose, 
The Politics of Life Itself, 85. 
14 Frank L. Greenway & William T. Cefalu, “Obesity and Its Treatment in Type 2 Diabetes,” in Mark N.  Fein-
glos & M. Angelyn Bethel (eds.), Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus – An Evidence-Based Approach to Practical Management 
(Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 2008), 333-350. 
15 Steward B. Harris, Robert J. Petrella & Wendy Leadbetter, “Lifestyle Interventions for Type 2 Diabetes: 
Relevance for Clinical Practice,” Canadian Family Physician, vol. 49 (2003), 1618-1625, 1619. 
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cise programme afterwards, followed up by the constitution of patient networks, which were 
supposed to run independently, or with a minimum of involvement from health professionals.  
Alongside the diabetes school and the exercise programme, the patients attended either their 
GP or the Hospital for periodic consultations.  In recent years there has been much funding for 
health projects addressing chronic illness and lifestyle diseases.  Type 2 diabetes has in partic-
ular been targeted as an important focus area.  Therefore, the health project focused on here is 
one among many that targets lifestyle issues, and thus addresses a highly charged contempo-
rary health issue, attracting funding and political attention.  A relatively large number of dia-
betics live in the general area where the empirical work has taken place, and preventing life-
style diseases thus constitutes an on-going health political objective.  Political as well as medi-
cal systems both strive to enhance the participation and involvement of citizens and patients 
in the area.  The rationale is that if patients are able to take proper care of themselves, the pub-
lic hospitals and the municipalities (and ultimately the State, that is) will be able to save mon-
ey on expensive treatment.  This is due to the fact that health care services in the Scandinavian 
welfare states are paid for by taxation.   
The age range of the participants in my research was between 35 and 74, of which there 
were many younger people among the participants, i.e. who were around forty years of age.  
Quite a few were retired, placing the average age of participants at the high end of the scale.  
Moreover, there were roughly as many men as women in the diabetes school, the diabetes ex-
ercise team, as well as in the motivational groups.  There were newly diagnosed participants 
in the groups as well as more experienced diabetics (from a few months of experience up to 
seven years).  A dietician and a nurse presented the diabetes school curriculum; they led a 
three-hour session, offered once a week for four weeks.  There were at most sixteen and no 
less than twelve participants.  The diabetes exercise programme was led by a physiotherapist.  
It met twice a week for one hour throughout the eight weeks.  There were always between 
eight and fourteen participants in the exercise programme.   
The diabetics in the diabetes school and in the diabetes exercise group seemed to be 
there for reasons other than diabetes.  Some would be there because they had retired, perhaps 
lost a partner, and felt they had considerable time at their disposal and therefore saw these 
activities as a chance to meet other people; others came because they wanted the free exercise 
to help them lose weight.  Another reason for attendance: one’s wife would like one to partici-
pate, allowing her to sit in as a relative, and take notes on everything concerned with healthy 
food recipes.  Some had physical conditions (i.e. a broken hip or a sprained ankle) that might 
benefit from the activity programme.  Some were lonely.  Most of them were there because 
they wanted to lose weight.  Diabetes seemed to be the ‘ticket’ to access this offer from the 
hospital and the municipality. 
 
Method 
I participated and observed during the diabetes school and in the exercise programme, some-
times passively and at times actively involved in talking to the participants and taking part in 
the exercises.  I took notes during the classes and on the way home, and that same evening or 
the following day, I composed a more detailed account of what had transpired during the dia-
betes school and the exercise programme.  I participated actively in sweating through the ex-
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ercises, while talking to the participants during the breaks.  After these sessions, I wrote down 
keywords and the same evening or the day after, collected those notes and constructed a more 
cohesive account of the events.  During the doctors’ and nurses’ consultations in the diabetes 
out-patient ward I participated passively and made an ethnographic report using the key-
words I wrote down after each session.   
Three individual interviews were conducted with three different male participants in 
the diabetes school, at different times throughout the four weeks.  Afterwards, during the ex-
ercise programme, where most of the same individuals from the diabetes school would partic-
ipate, a focus group interview with four participants was conducted.  One of the participants 
had already participated in an individual interview.  Two of the individual interviews were 
conducted in the private homes of the diabetics, and one individual interview and the focus 
group interview with the diabetes school participants were both conducted at the rehabilita-
tion centre, where the diabetes school and the exercise programme were held.  Moreover, two 
focus group interviews were conducted with the participants in two motivational groups (six 
and seven participants, respectively), organised by the local Diabetes Association.  For the 
purpose of this article the interviews that were conducted in Danish have been translated into 
English.  Schematically: 
 
The different settings, number of professionals, participants and interviewees in the study, and duration of 
observations.   
Setting Hospital consultations Diabetes 
School 
Exercise 
Programme 
Motivational Groups 
Professionals  2 doctors 2 nurses Nurse and 
dietician 
Physiother-
apist 
1 Diabetes 
Instructor 
2 Diabetes 
instructors 
Number of 
patients or 
participants 
9 patients 3 patients 12 – 16 
partici-
pants 
8 – 14 par-
ticipants 
6 particip. 7 particip. 
Interviews   3 individual interviews  
+ 1 focus group int.  (4 
informants) 
1 focus gr.  
Int.  (6 
inf.) 
1 focus gr.  
Int.  (7 inf.) 
Duration of 
observations  
10 min.  x 
9 
1 hour x 3 4 x 3 hours 1 x 5 hours 2 hours 2 hours 
 
The purpose of the fieldwork was to describe the self-care practices used by diabetics to pre-
vent future complications.  I focussed on the techniques used by diabetics in their attempts to 
change their lifestyle, to work on themselves in an effort to become ‘healthy.’16  I followed 
                                                 
16 The Stoic care for the self, epimelaia heauton,, and the transformation of the self through a work of the self is 
described among others by Ure in ‘Senecan Moods,’ 25-29.  See also Darryl De Marzio, “The Care of the Self: 
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James P. Spradley’s reflections on participant observation17 and was inspired by Harold Gar-
finkel’s ethno-methodological approach18 in an attempt to describe and analyse these practic-
es.  There was an interesting issue that stood out in the interviews and observations.  This was 
precisely the failure to care for the self that appeared in some of the diabetics’ accounts, indi-
cating irresolution, or a divided self.  This is where the concept stultitia appears relevant. 
 
A Diabetes Education Paradox—Experiences From an Out-patient Ward 
The above mentioned specific feature of the interviews and observations is particularly inter-
esting to focus on.  Of course, the fieldwork comprises much more than this perspective, but in 
the following I will focus on this specific issue in order to show how the concept stultitia could 
be applied in analysis.  During the fieldwork the following situation took place.  After the last 
day of the diabetes school courses, when the participants had all left, I stayed and talked to the 
nurse who had been teaching in the diabetes school.  The last participant who left the room 
was a very obese individual, who had consulted the nurse for an individual, informal talk af-
ter the end of the course.  Since I represented a university, the teacher was therefore keen to 
discuss a pressing issue, which concerned her, more specifically the fact that the diabetics all 
seem to enjoy the course, but do not seem to change their lifestyle. 
 
As [the last diabetic] has left the building, the nurse asks me about the diabetes education.  
She would like to hear my opinion.  She is clearly frustrated, because she feels that she does 
not reach the participants, and is not able to initiate a process of change.  She says that in the 
assessment questionnaires where it says “Was the diabetes school a success?”—the partici-
pants write “Yes,” but when it says “Have you changed your life?,” their response is “No.”  
She shakes her head despairingly.  “We teach them all these principles, but I don’t think we 
reach those who are very big.”  We talk for a while about ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic motiva-
tion,’ ‘knowledge’ and ‘learning.’  I can clearly feel her frustration about conducting a very 
fine course, but at the same time having the feeling that it does not initiate changes.19   
 
Interestingly, the diabetics report that they have benefitted from the course.  However, they do 
not seem to change their lifestyle.  The diabetes teacher therefore expresses what to her seems 
to be a paradoxical experience.  The same issue is raised by a nurse, with whom I had an in-
formal and non-recorded conversation during the observations in the out-patient ward, and 
whose patient consultations I attended.  When talking to the nurse after a consultation with a 
newly diagnosed diabetic, she explains that it is difficult to help the patients who are obese.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Alcibiades I, Socratic Teaching, and Ethics Education,” The Journal of Education, vol. 187, no.  3 (2007), 103-
127.  Moreover, Sebastian Harrer discusses central concepts concerning this topic in “The Theme of Subjec-
tivity in Foucault’s Lecture Series L’Herméneutique du Sujet,” Foucault Studies, vol. 2 (2005), 75-96.  I find 
Harrer’s argument convincing, and I follow his interpretation of the late practices of the self.  See also Chris-
toph Menke, “Two Kinds of Practice: On the Relation between Social Discipline and the Aesthetics of Exist-
ence,” Constellations, vol. 10, no. 2 (2003), 199-210, and Dick Willems, “Managing One’s Body Using Self-
Management Techniques: Practicing Autonomy,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, vol. 21, (2000), 23-38.   
17 James P. Spradley, Participant Observation (USA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 1980). 
18 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1967). 
19 Observation notes. 
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However, she is optimistic concerning this patient.  She thinks that she has the necessary re-
sources to cope with the condition.  She explains that: 
 
‘many of our patients are—how shall I put this in politically correct terms—from a social 
group that—In any case, they don’t have the same resources available that others do.’  
 
We talk about the difficulties in teaching the patients in the diabetes schools, and that in these 
cases it can be an ‘uphill journey.’  She refers to a doctor whom she tells me uses the expres-
sion,  
 
‘They lack the gene to pull themselves together.’  She tells me, ‘Here in the hospital, we do 
not see the patients who have social networks, and who have the intellectual and economic 
resources to manage their situation.  Those individuals quickly learn to put to use the prin-
ciples we teach them.  They take care of themselves at home by themselves.  It is the com-
plex patients that we see in the hospital.  The others, they attend their own general practi-
tioner.  We get the cases that have gone wrong, which their GP can’t deal with.’ 
 
We talk for quite a long time.  The nurse seems to care considerably about the issue of diabetes 
care.  We also talk about the diabetes school, to which the nurse responds that she thinks that 
the third week is tough, because that is when they talk about disease issues and late complica-
tions.  She is curious to know what I think about it, and expresses doubts about the effect of 
the teaching.  She feels that it has little effect on the participants.  She is concerned about how 
to get the diabetics to change.  ‘Sometimes it is difficult to know why the patients show up for 
the consultations, since they have to be motivated in order to get anything out of it.  If you are 
not motivated, what’s the point?’ She explains: ‘If you ask a patient why they have come, what 
they mean to gain from it, then they say: “I don’t know.”  They attend because their doctor has 
told them to.  But they don’t seem to know how to make use of our services or why they are 
here.’ 
The nurse reflects on the lack of motivation, the unwillingness or incapability of taking 
care of the self.  When perceived with the rationality of the diabetes education field, a rational-
ity which to various degrees is also adopted by the patients, it seems that the health profes-
sionals describe the patients, who do not take proper care of themselves, as lacking mental 
capacities such as motivation, understanding, awareness etc.  In light of the experiences re-
ported above I will analyse the specific concept, stultitia (madness, foolishness), which Fou-
cault analysed in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, to explore this seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion. 
 
Stultitia and the Care of the Self 
As mentioned above, the prevalent health norms simply render those who are not able to 
change their bad habits incomprehensible.  The teachers in the diabetes school are genuinely 
frustrated when they feel that their efforts are in vain.  The diabetics, who from the perspec-
tive of the health professionals are either unwilling or incapable of taking care of themselves, 
also sometimes express this hopelessness themselves.  They report to the health professionals 
that they understand the gravity of the situation, and they clearly say that they want to live 
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healthily, but at the same time it is as if they are reluctant or powerless.  In the following I 
want to shed light on this phenomenon, which in patient education research is usually re-
ferred to as ‘denial,’ ‘lack of motivation’ or ‘self-care deficit.’  There is a comprehensive litera-
ture on diabetes and self-care,20 but in the following I would like to shed light on this phenom-
enon using Foucault’s analyses of the condition stultitia.   
Foucault began his career with an impressive study of manifestations of madness in The 
History of Madness.  He was interested in depicting how the exclusion of madness in the Classi-
cal Age (the age of rationalism) had created an object of psychiatric investigation, which we 
now refer to as mental illness.21  Madness, then, was understood as the other side of reason22 
and was basically a manifestation of ‘a nothingness.’23  The nothingness of unreason was treat-
ed appropriately, simply by making these paradoxical manifestations disappear.  It was the 
nothingness of unreason which Foucault used to perform a critique of reason—a response to 
the Kantian problem of critique.24  Later, in the seventies, Foucault took up the study of mad-
ness in the nineteenth century, where it was constructed as abnormality.  In the lectures from 
1974-75, published as Abnormal,25 he studied how madness was constructed as risk or potential 
danger, and as abnormal behaviour.  This was done analysing penal cases, in which medicine 
and law tried to establish immanent criteria for distinguishing mad individuals from the nor-
mal.  Instincts and inclinations to dangerous behaviour was the new sign of madness and the 
objective for a psychiatric technology. 
 
On the basis of the instincts and around what was previously the problem of madness, it be-
comes possible to organise the whole problematic of the abnormal at the level of the most el-
ementary and everyday conduct.  This transition to the minuscule, the great drift from the 
cannibalistic monster of the beginning of the nineteenth century, is finally converted into the 
form of all the little perverse monsters who have been constantly proliferating since the end 
of the nineteenth century.26 
 
Trouble was that this attempt led to the discovery that we find all the little traces and signs of 
abnormal behaviour deep in the hearts of ourselves, in our everyday, normal conduct.  And 
consequently, we have to be aware of our selves, because madness is found in the little oddi-
                                                 
20 Shannon M. Spenceley & Beverly A. Williams, “Self-Care from the Perspective of People Living with Dia-
betes,” CJNR, vol. 38, no. 3 (2006), 124-145.  See also Sally E. Thorne & Barbara L. Paterson, “Health Care 
Professional Support for Self-Care Management in Chronic Illness: Insights from Diabetes Research,” Patient 
Education & Counselling, vol. 42 (2001), 81-90. 
21 See for example Nikolas Rose, “Of madness itself: Histoire de la folie and the object of psychiatric history,” 
in A. Still & I. Velody (eds.), Rewriting the History of Madness; Studies in Foucault’s Histoire de la Folie (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 142-149.  Moreover, Frédéric Gros has written an inspiring little book on Foucault’s 
concept of Madness, Foucault et la folie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997). 
22 See Shoshona Felman, “Madness and Philosophy or Literature’s Reason,” Yale French Studies, vol. 52 
(1975), 206-228. 
23 Foucault, The History of Madness, 249-250. 
24 See Jason L. Powell “An Enlightened Madness,” Human Studies, vol. 25 (2002), 311-316. 
25 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, edited by Valerio Marchetti & An-
tonella Salomoni, translated by Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 2003). 
26 Ibid., 132. 
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ties of our own lives when we least expect it.  Here, Canguilhem’s notion of the normal as a 
differentiated, polemical notion resonates in Foucault’s thought.27 
 
Little crimes, of course, and little mental illnesses; tiny delinquencies and almost impercep-
tible abnormalities of behaviour essentially constitute the organisational and fundamental 
field of psychiatry.28 
 
We thus discover that normality and pathology is not an easily differentiable contradiction, 
but that there are traits of most mental disorders in so-called normal minds, too.29  Madness is 
deeply embedded in rationality.  Subsequently, we learn to suspect that everyone is at least 
slightly abnormal.   
Later, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, madness is taken up again briefly, this time in 
the context of education and practices of caring for the self.  There is a comprehensive litera-
ture on this late turn in his literary activities,30 but it will be necessary to focus on a specific 
detail in these lectures, which is the condition one is in before one learns to care for the self.  
The lectures constitute Foucault’s ‘legwork’ that eventually resulted in volume 2 and 3 of The 
History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasures31 and The Care of the Self.32  Importantly, the term stulti-
tia allows one to reactivate Foucault’s early works on madness.  In The Hermeneutics Foucault 
directs attention to Cynic, Epicurean, and Stoic ascetic practices of the self.  The pathological 
vantage point regarding the techniques of life, which constitutes the source of knowledge, is 
the same as it was for Foucault in the case when madness was used as a vantage point for a 
critique of reason.  In education, the ‘pathological’ vantage point is the case when an individu-
al is incapable of caring for the self.  The notion stultitia has not been thoroughly elaborated by 
Foucault, nor have others, to my knowledge, investigated its role and place in his literary ac-
tivities,33 presumably because it is only mentioned briefly in passing.  It is mentioned in arti-
cles concerned with Foucault’s interest in Stoic practices of the care for the self,34 but it is not 
                                                 
27 Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, 164-165, 196-200, 239. 
28 Foucault, Abnormal, 163. 
29 Cf.  Nikolas Rose, The Psychological Complex, on ‘the feeble minded,’ 98. 
30 Tina (A.C.) Besley & Michael A. Peters, Subjectivity and Truth: Foucault, Education, and the Culture of the Self 
(New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2007).  Michael A. Peters, “Truth-Telling as an Educational Practice of the 
Self: Foucault, Parrhesia, and the Ethics of Subjectivity,” Oxford Review of Education, vol. 29, no. 2 (2003), 207-
223.  Peter A. Miller, “The Art of Self-Fashioning, or Foucault on Plato and Derrida,” Foucault Studies, vol. 2 
(2005), 54-74. 
31 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure – The History of Sexuality: Volume 2 (London: Penguin Books, 1992 
[1984]). 
32 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self – The History of Sexuality: Volume 3 (London: Penguin Books, 1990 
[1984]). 
33 The term is used in Stoic texts by Possidonius, Epictetus, and others to designate the madness or bestial 
side of the human being, and it is contrasted with the sapientes, i.e. the wise.  This beast-like nature is what 
the educational practices are supposed to mend.  In contemporary papers about ancient Greek philosophy, 
the term is most often not mentioned in the Latin form, but translated with the above-mentioned meaning, 
i.e. the bestial aspect of the human being.  See for example Henry Dyson, “The God Within: The Normative 
Self in Epictetus,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 3 (2009), 235-253. 
34 Ure, ‘Senecan Moods,’ 47, 51. 
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the primary target of the analyses.  Yet, it constitutes the point of departure for learning to 
take care of the self, and therefore it is worth reflecting for a moment on this concept.  He men-
tions the condition stultitia a couple of times in passing during the lectures.35  It means mad-
ness, a condition from which a person must be relieved, a condition in which the individual is 
not able to care for the self.  The first chapter in Foucault that discusses stultitia follows the 
passage in which he speaks of the similarity between the ancient schools of philosophy and 
the clinic.  In antiquity, the doctor cared for the body and the philosopher for the soul.  Both 
offered a kind of treatment (therapeuein) for the ills that infect either the body or the soul.  The 
word for this pathological condition is precisely ‘pathos,’ referring to both ‘illness’ and ‘pas-
sion.’36  The doctor relieves the pain and treats the morbid, bodily condition, and the philoso-
pher, on the other hand, treats the passions, i.e. the morbid condition stemming from bad hab-
its and luxury.  ‘A philosophy school is an iatreion (a clinic).  You should not walk out of a 
philosophy school in pleasure, but in pain.’37  In the philosophy schools a set of very well-
established and elaborated dietetics to treat the passions appeared.  It was not just a matter of 
correcting the thoughts, but rather, through techniques of life, to practise and develop a mas-
tery of the self, to focus attention on the self and to prepare the self for future ills. 
In order to demonstrate what the morbid condition, stultitia, is about, it will be neces-
sary to carefully go through the chapter in which Foucault sets out the role of the philosopher, 
the ‘helping hand,’ who aims to help the individual, who is in the grip of bad habits, to care 
for the self.  Instead of marking a transitional passage from ignorance to mastery, the care of 
the self should be applied to the self by the self for all of life.  Thus, pedagogy gains a new 
meaning.  It is no longer just training in adolescence that enables the passage from ignorance 
to competence.  It rather gets a distinct critical function.  It becomes a matter of continuous 
correction.  It is no longer a matter of learning a syllabus but a perpetual, ethical process of 
self-correction coextensive with life by the aid of technologies of the self.  The care of the self in 
the 1st and 2nd centuries A.C. becomes an unqualified principle: a principle of lifelong learning 
that applies to everyone, but which is always ‘put to work in exclusive forms.’38  One of the 
many differences between education in the 1st and 2nd centuries A.C. and the modern, or late 
modern, conditions we face today, is that the person, who is in the grip of bad habits, needed 
an ideal, a set of truths by which he could exercise a care of the self.  The philosophy schools 
offered precisely that, i.e. abstract and ideal principles of truth.  The words of a master were 
not challenged or doubted.  They constituted a truth to be obtained by the student.  The func-
tion of truths was to change the subject’s mode of being.  It was not a matter of philosophy as 
we understand it today, i.e. the attempt to establish criteria, and explore the limitations, meth-
ods and conditions for knowing the truth, but rather a matter of a process of truth-seeking, an 
‘ethopoetic’ activity,39 which transforms an individual’s mode of being.  The student simply 
chose to accept the authority of the master and the truth he offered.  This is not in the same 
way an option for contemporary students, or modern man for that matter, who faces a condi-
                                                 
35 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 130-134, 465-467. 
36 Ibid, 97. 
37 Ibid., 99. 
38 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 126. 
39 Ibid., 237. 
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tion of contingency of truths.  Today, we are constantly on the search for principles or norms 
to guide us in our attempt to care properly for the self.  These truths or norms are constantly 
contested, and their polemical or political contingency is well-known.   
The Roman form of spiritual guidance took an interesting form.  The guide ceased be-
ing an institutional figure.  He became a personal friend or a private counsellor, but the 
asymmetrical relationship remained.  The relationship was based on an exchange of services 
and very often founded on letter correspondence.  The other became a personal friend – some-
one to whom the individual could entrust himself.  The tone between the friend and the indi-
vidual who asked for advice became more personal and—this point is crucial—more common 
and ordinary.  Typically, someone would send a letter to a trusted friend, explaining carefully 
about a problem or the state of his life.  These letters were about both everyday practical prob-
lems and of a moral nature.  The objective of learning was no longer that of replacing igno-
rance with knowledge, but rather to correct bad habits and vices. 
 
The practice of the self is established against a background of errors, bad habits and an es-
tablished and deeply ingrained deformation and dependence that must be shaken off.  What 
clearly is crucial is that the practice of the self develops more on the axis of correction-
liberation than on the axis of training-knowledge.40 
 
The individual had to prepare against, not so much external dangers as against the evil within.  
The correction aims at ‘stripping away of previous education, established habits, and the envi-
ronment’.41  At the base of this correction of bad habits is found a critical attitude towards cul-
ture, civilisation and society, i.e. towards the lives led and values shared by others.  An atti-
tude also found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and later Norbert Elias.  At the same time, focussing 
a corrective practice on oneself is implicitly directing a critique towards others. 
 
The practice of the self will become increasingly a critical activity with regards to oneself, 
one’s cultural world, and the lives led by others.  Of course, this is not at all to say that prac-
tice of the self only has a critical role.  The training component remains and is always pre-
sent, but it is fundamentally linked to the practice of criticism.42 
 
These networks of friendship, whereby the practice of the self is exercised, these various 
groups, whose members depend on a relationship to others, either a master or a group of 
friends, are based on the idea that the subject is ‘badly formed, or rather deformed, vicious, in 
the grip of bad habits.’43  Instead of striving for knowledge to replace ignorance, one should 
strive towards establishing a: 
 
rational will that defines the morally sound action and the morally valid subject. […] The 
individual should strive for a status of subject that he has never known at any moment of his 
life.  He has to replace the status as non-subject with the status of subject defined by the full-
                                                 
40 Ibid., 94. 
41 Ibid., 95 
42 Ibid., 93. 
43 Ibid., 129. 
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ness of the self’s relationship to the self.  He has to constitute himself, and this is where the 
other comes in.  I think this theme is rather important in the history of the practice of the self 
and, more generally, in the history of subjectivity in the Western World.44 
 
The theme of non-subjectivity (or nothingness) was also apparent in The History of Madness, as 
well as with the madmen in Abnormal (who did not have the status of legal subjects).  The per-
son who is in the grip of bad habits, who needs to be corrected, cannot initiate this transfor-
mation by himself.  The non-subject must constitute himself as a subject with the help of an-
other person.  To put it bluntly this is where the need for the special kind of psycho-pedagogy 
begins.  ‘The subject can no longer be the person who carries out his own transformation, and 
the need for a master is now inserted here.’45  Foucault takes as an example a letter from Sene-
ca to Lucilius (letter 52) in which they discuss the moral obstacles for achieving virtue, for 
conducting a proper care of the self, and more importantly, the means to escape the morbid, 
pathological condition, which we are in, before we start to care for the self. 
 
How, Lucilius, should we designate this impulse which, if we incline in one direction, drags 
us in another and pushes us in the direction from which we wish to flee?  What is this ene-
my of our soul, which prevents us from ever willing once and for all?  We drift between dif-
ferent plans; we do not will with a free, absolute (absolute) will, always firm.  ‘It is madness 
(stultitia),’ you answer, ‘for which nothing is constant and nothing satisfies for long.’  But 
how, when will we tear ourselves free from its grip?  No one is strong enough by himself to 
rise above the waves […]  He needs someone to give him a hand […], someone to pull him 
to the bank (aliquis educat).46  
 
Stultitia is not just a mental irrationality, a mental illness, or a delirium that can be corrected 
by rational judgement.  Rather, ‘a whole therapeutics and dietetics is required in order to dis-
solve the passions, not just a correction of thought.’47  Stultitia is something that is not settled 
on anything and not satisfied by anything.  Seneca says: 
 
This mental restlessness, this irresolution is basically what we call stultitia.  Stultitia here is 
something that is not settled on anything and not satisfied by anything.  Now, he says, no 
one is in such good health (satis valet) that he can get out of (emergere) this condition by 
himself.  Someone must lend him a hand and pull him out: oportet aliquis educat.48 
 
Stultitia is a state of madness, and the term directs attention towards Foucault’s works on 
madness in the Classical Age, i.e. the medieval ships of fools, stultifera navis.49  There are cer-
tain aspects of the early work on madness that correspond with the analysis of stultitia.  The 
stulti are not calm, are not concerned about or attending to themselves, but constantly worry 
about the future.  They do not attend to the present, but are concerned with the future, which 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 129. 
45 Ibid., 130. 
46 Seneca, cited in Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 145, note 4. 
47 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 104, note 54. 
48 Ibid., 131. 
49 Foucault, The History of Madness, part one, chapter 1. 
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is a nothingness, a non-existence.  “Not only are [the stulti] doomed to discontinuity and the 
flux, they are also doomed to dispossession and emptiness.  They exist in nothingness.”50  The 
stulti stand out as foolish or even monstrous to others, precisely because they are unwilling or 
unable to care for themselves.  Those who seem to do things that bring their health in danger 
stand out as mad to others, and their actions are commonly ridiculed, hence the meaning of 
the word stultify.  Stultitia does not so much indicate a mental irrationality, and it is not a men-
tal illness.  Nor is it a social danger, an abnormality of behaviour, a potential risk, which re-
quires normalisation and discipline.  Rather, the behaviour of a person who is in this condition 
of stultitia is incomprehensible to others, not because their behaviour is deviant or potentially 
dangerous to others, but rather because the stultus has not established a relationship to him-
self.  The actions of the stultus may very well be unpredictable, but most importantly they are 
not aimed at the self.  The unpredictability is not a warning of danger, but a warning of the 
lack of care for the self.  Stultitia designates a condition of irresolution, of losing focus on one-
self, of being confused and bewildered, of not caring for the self properly, of having lost sense 
of direction, of not knowing how to distinguish between passions and the true will.  Foucault 
paraphrases Seneca by saying: 
 
We are in this condition of stultitia when we have not yet taken care of ourselves.  Stultitia 
is, then, if you like, the other pole to the practice of the self.  The practice of the self has to 
deal with stultitia as its raw material, if you like, and its objective is to escape from it.  What 
is stultitia?  The stultus is someone who has not cared for himself.51 
 
This means that the stultus is someone who is uneducated or uncivilised.52  Foucault singles 
out three characteristics: The first is this: The stultus is someone blown by the wind and open 
to the external world.  He is not capable of discriminating between his own desires, habits, 
illusions, etc. and what comes in from the outside world.  He does not distinguish between his 
own mind and the external representations.  He does not possess the ability to examine his 
own mind and to determine what stems from himself and what belongs to the external world.  
Therefore the stultus is broken up in time.  He remembers nothing and lets his life pass by, 
incapable of restoring unity to his life.  He does not try to direct his attention and his will to a 
well-determined end.  ‘The stultus lets life pass by and constantly changes his viewpoint.  His 
life, and so his existence, pass by without memory or will.  Hence, the stultus is constantly 
changing his way of life.’53  Consequently, the stultus is not able to will properly.  Willing 
properly means willing ‘freely, absolutely, and always.’54  Willing freely means 
 
                                                 
50 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 467. 
51 Ibid., 131. 
52 On the topic of the uncivilized, see Murray K. Simpson, “From savage to citizen: education, colonialism 
and idiocy,” British Journal of Sociology of Education, vol. 28, no. 5 (2007), 561-574.   
53 Ibid., 131-132. 
54 Ibid., 133. 
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[W]illing without what it is that one wills being determined by this or that event, this or that 
representation, this or that inclination.  To will freely is to will without any determination, 
and the stultus is determined by what comes from both outside and inside.55 
 
Second, the 
 
[S]tultus wants several things at once, and these are divergent without being contradictory.  
So he does not want one and only one thing absolutely.  The stultus wants something and at 
the same time regrets it.56 
 
Third and last, the stultus is someone who ‘wills, but he also wills with inertia, lazily, and his 
willing is constantly interrupted and changes its objective.’57  The will of the stultus is then 
limited, relative, fragmentary, and unsettled; or, with a reference to his early works on mad-
ness, alienated. 
 
Learning to Care for the Self—‘Eduction’ 
Stultitia is thus, according to Seneca, the condition that one must rise above.  That entails di-
recting the will towards an object that it can always want, want freely and absolutely.  Such an 
object is the self.  The only thing that can be willed freely, absolutely and always, without tak-
ing external determinations into account, is the self.  According to Seneca, one can will the self 
without relating it to anything else and without changing it over time and on different occa-
sions.  The objective is a firm identity.  Bear in mind, of course, that the subject, a firm identity 
of the self—even as a dialectical striving towards the self as a yet unreached ideal of unity, 
according to Foucault, is the biggest illusion of modernity.  This is seen clearly in The Order of 
Things in which he states in the concluding remarks that ‘man would be erased, like a face 
drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.’58  That the subject is a construction, shaped by prac-
tices (of the self and others), is as evident in his late works as it was in the 1960s. 
 
In stultitia there is a disconnection between the will and the self, a non-connection, a non-
belonging characteristic of stultitia, which is both its most manifest effect and deepest root.  
To escape from stultitia will be precisely to act so that one can will the self, so that one can 
will oneself, so that one can strive towards the self as the only object one can will freely, ab-
solutely and always […]  Inasmuch as stultitia is defined by this non-relationship to the self, 
the individual cannot escape from it by himself.  The constitution of the self as the object ca-
pable of orientating the will […] can only be accomplished through the intermediary of 
someone else.  Between the stultus individual and the sapiens individual, the other is neces-
sary […] [This ‘other’ is someone who] has achieved a relationship of self-control, of self-
possession, of pleasure in the self […]  The will that is typical of stultitia is unable to want to 
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58 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge Classics, 
2010 [1966]), 422. 
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care about the self.  The care of the self consequently requires […] the other’s presence, in-
sertion, and intervention.59 
 
This ideal of self-mastery, of self-control, is ‘enkrateia,’ which is analysed in The Use of the 
Pleasures.60  Foucault then goes on to describe the function of this other, on which the union of 
‘will’ and ‘self’ essentially relies.  The other person is not an educator in a traditional sense.  
He is not someone instructing truths or setting an example (‘educare’).  Rather, that other per-
son should ‘educere’ (with an ‘e’), which means ‘offer a hand,’ ‘extricate from,’ or ‘lead out of.’  
It is an ‘operation focused on the mode of being of the subject himself, and not just the trans-
mission of knowledge.’61  Foucault calls it ‘eduction’ and not the traditional ‘education.’  But 
who is the person capable of teaching the truth?  Foucault’s Seneca pronounces the philoso-
pher as the individual who has acquired a mastership of the self, a proper relationship to the 
self.  Thus, it is the philosopher to whom one should turn in order to get the directions that 
one needs in order to reach a fulfilled relationship of self to the self.  The philosopher is the 
hegemon, the guide or director, capable of ‘governing men, of governing those who govern 
men.’62  Because of the commonplace role of the philosopher, however, he had become a figure 
integrated in daily life and opinion.  The philosopher was no longer a prophet, external to dai-
ly life (as for example Heraclitus), but integrated in the decision-making at a secular level, in 
daily, political, ordinary life (like Seneca).  At the same time, the role of the professional phi-
losopher became blurred, because he needed to relate to everyday matters, of social and famil-
ial conduct.  The role of the professional philosopher became de-professionalised, because 
people needed counsels of prudence and detailed recommendations.  The philosopher could 
no longer give advice of a very general nature, but instead became counsellors of existence 
‘with regard to everything and nothing; with regard to a particular life, to family conduct, and 
to political conduct as well.’63 
The de-professionalised role of the philosopher, the philosopher genuinely integrated 
in the daily mode of being, characterises the ‘practice of spiritual direction as a form of social 
relationship between any individuals whatever outside of the field of philosophers.’64  There is 
a whole array of literature that announces itself when speaking about guiding or motivating: 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation,65 coaching, counselling, and the like.66  It corresponds espe-
cially with the modes of government described by Nikolas Rose in Governing the Soul.67  Now-
adays, the ‘eductor’ is represented by motivational therapists, health professionals, teachers, 
                                                 
59 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 133-134. 
60 Foucault, The Use of the Pleasures, 65. 
61 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 134. 
62 Ibid., 135. 
63 Ibid., 143-144. 
64 Ibid., 144. 
65 Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New 
Directions,” Contemporary Educational Psychology, vol. 25 (2000), 54-67. 
66 Michael A. Peters, “Foucault, Counselling, and the Aesthetics of Existence,” British Journal of Guidance & 
Counselling, vol. 33, no. 3 (2005), 383-396. 
67 For example in Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul. The shaping of the private self (London: Free Association 
Books, 1989), second edition. See for example the chapter ‘The Production of the self,’ 103. 
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health educationists, and others who do not teach in a traditional way, but who operate by 
letting individuals formulate their wishes, desires, hopes, etc. for a better future, and who then 
provide the techniques or practices with which these individuals are enabled to work on 
themselves.   
What Foucault found in the ancient practices of the self was precisely a set of precepts 
and instructions concerning the care of the self that did not focus on the desire of the subject.  
These practices of the self were instead focused on practical and technical administration.  The 
ascetic exercises were not intended to renounce the desire of the self or to pass a moral sen-
tence on the subject who had acted inappropriately, nor were they to promote an individual’s 
desire as authentic or personal.  Rather, they were technical exercises intended to administer 
the ‘use of pleasures.’  Foucault refers to Seneca’s text De ira, in which Seneca examines the 
errors he has committed during the day.  These are not ‘moral vices,’ but ‘should be under-
stood as basically technical errors.  He was unable to deploy or handle well the instructions he 
was using.’68  This is what the ancient dietetic instructions were designed to do.  They were 
exercises, practical exercises that transformed the relation of the self to the self.  They are eve-
ryday rules of conduct, precepts, instructions that direct the practical, everyday being of an 
individual, changing the mode of being of the subject.  They give advice on how to conduct 
oneself as regards the pleasures of life.69 
The above elaboration of the Hermeneutics shows that Foucault’s early works on mad-
ness as well as his work from the seventies on abnormality is echoed in the concept of stultitia.  
In this way madness constitutes a negative experience that provides a foothold for analysing 
the contemporary.  It is the negativity of madness that constitutes the point of departure for 
analysing the discursive as well as non-discursive practices within a given historical context.  
Those forms of behaviour that stand out as mad to others constitute the catalyst for under-
standing the practices established to correct or normalise those mad behaviours.  It provides a 
strategic foothold for thought.  The various uses of madness throughout his literary activities 
could be summarised as such: first, in the Classical Age, it appeared as an incomprehensible, 
delirious nothingness, being the anti-pole to reason, although his analyses demonstrate that 
the unreasonable is found firmly within the various forms of rationality.  Later, in the middle 
of the seventies, Foucault analysed madness as abnormality, something which became a part 
of the normal, only deviant.  He analysed various techniques with which to normalise abnor-
mal behaviour, thus identifying madness in all the minuscule, common practices of everyday 
life.  Later, in the beginning of the eighties, he refers briefly to the idea of madness again, only 
this time as an even more intricate aspect of individual behaviour, i.e. in the relationship of the 
self to the self.  Madness, through Posidonius and Seneca, is analysed as a fundamental condi-
tion, which is a prerequisite for entering a learning process.   
It is worth for a moment to pause and reflect on the difference between Abnormal and 
the Hermeneutics.  It is the non-connection of the will to the self, which is at the same time the 
cause and effect of stultitia, i.e. an internal fraction.  The purpose of the process of education is 
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to rectify this conflict (cf. Rousseau and Kant’s insistence that one is not free if one wants 
something, which one is not capable of.  Therefore the purpose of education is to establish a 
unity of capability and will, or pouvoir and voloir).  Now, the idea that it is possible to over-
come this primordial fraction is the cause of our constant work on the self, our efforts to im-
prove ourselves.  But what if it is essentially impossible to ever rectify this distinction—if it is 
in essence the kernel of subjectivity?  The heart of the matter for the late Foucault was there-
fore to investigate the practices through which we become subjects, i.e. through practices and 
technologies of the self.  It is not a return to the subject or the self as an entity or an inner core 
of identity, but rather a way of investigating the technologies and practices that we apply to 
ourselves in a constant modulation, formation and constitution of the self.  And the point of 
departure, the reason for applying these exercises, is the condition stultitia.   
 
Possible Interpretations of the Paradox of Patient Education—What Do the Diabetics Say?  
One may interpret the paradox of patient education, i.e. the dilemma of the health profession-
als described above, in various ways.  One may say that the diabetes school teachers do not 
understand what the diabetics really need.  It would also be a very plausible conclusion to say 
that the diabetics do not feel that they have a problem, and therefore do not need to change 
their lifestyle.  Another interpretation could be that the participants think the diabetes school 
is a success because they get the background information they need in order to introduce 
changes to their lives accordingly.  However, and interestingly, they do not necessarily feel 
that they need to make any changes.  It is just nice to know the causes of one’s future agony.  
They know they are in a risk zone, and they know they will have to take care of themselves, 
and now they also know how specifically they could do this if they begin to feel the need. 
There are different rationalities at play among the diabetics.  This is evident from diabe-
tes research in general, i.e. that an elderly male diabetic has a different approach to his condi-
tion than a young female diabetic.  These differences are visible in the ways the diabetics han-
dle their lives with the diagnosis.  Generally, female diabetics try to promote their health 
through dietary means, whereas male diabetics approach the lifestyle changes through physi-
cal activities.  The focus group interviews portray these differences through the discussions 
that the participants have with each other.  There are different responses to the question ‘Is it 
difficult to live with diabetes?’  Some say it only requires that a person get used to the rules 
that one must obey, that one makes a habit out of it, and that one does not think about the 
condition once this new state of life has been instated.  Others find it tremendously trouble-
some to follow the rules of healthy living, and blame themselves for not trying hard enough.  
A male interviewee, for example, describes diabetes, not as a disease, but as a ‘vice’ or a ‘flaw.’  
It is not the disease that is the problem.  The disease is only a consequence of the real problem, 
which is obesity or even laziness, as a female diabetic exclaims.  Others regard the rules as a 
challenge, an opportunity to experiment, through which they can personalise the rules to 
make them fit into their situation.  Others will just ignore certain recommendations and follow 
the ones that make sense to them.  The recommendations are sometimes seen as instruments 
for a regulation of the self.  ‘I can have a few pieces of dark chocolate, not milk chocolate’ or ‘If 
I stay on the diet all the weekdays, then I can have a cheat day on Saturday.’  As such there are 
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different motifs, different rationalities, and ways of practicing a care for the self among the 
diabetics. 
Another possible interpretation is that some of the diabetics have not fully understood 
the situation they are in.  This interpretation touches upon Leriche’s claim, mentioned at the 
beginning of the paper, i.e. that health is life lived in the silence of the organs.  When asked if 
he feels ill (Danish: syg)70 this 37 year old male diabetic says:  
 
No, not really I think—well—I think things are going well, really well.  And perhaps I make 
light of the situation, that I have a condition [sygdom], but I can’t tell myself that I am ill [syg] 
—I can’t, because then I would become even more ill [syg].  I have to be positive, you know, 
and laugh about it all—I think. 
 
He feels that it is necessary not to accept the story presented in the diabetes school, because 
otherwise he would feel seriously ill.  It is important that he keeps saying to himself that 
things are going very well.  And they probably are on many accounts.  Here, he touches on the 
rationality of the diabetes school.  The purpose of the school is to make the diabetics aware 
that in fact they have a disease, and that they should not take their condition too lightly.  A 
teacher in the diabetes school explains that she used to tell the participants that diabetes is 
‘dead serious,’ but that she has changed her choice of terms, as she feels no need to scare them.  
The purpose is to let the participants know that they have a serious condition, but at the same 
time in a constructive way so that they do not despair, but actually acquire some skills with 
which they can manage the situation, to cope with their condition.  When asked about his own 
goals or aims the above patient explains:  
 
Well, the aim is to realise that I have a disease, right, and take it seriously.  I probably don’t 
do that, that is—I probably haven’t understood the situation.  Once in a while I… Well, I 
think I still take it too lightly.   
 
But what will happen if one does not care properly for the self (disregarding for the moment 
the disputes about how one ought to take proper care of the self)?  This shared negative image 
is often described in horrifying terms.  Some interviewees refer to relatives, some to friends or 
acquaintances, some to information they have received from the hospital or media and some 
to the experiences they had from the wards when they were long ago diagnosed with diabetes 
and hospitalised.  This elderly woman explains: 
 
My father had diabetes and that is… is a nightmare to think about.  He had both his legs 
amputated, and… During all the years he lived he was really ill [syg], and it was really hor-
rible, and… Thinking back when I saw that as a child… […]  Having a father who is just ly-
                                                 
70 The distinction between illness and disease does not exist in Danish.  Therefore the context decides wheth-
er one uses one or the other word in the interpretation of the quotes.  This is possibly the reason why the 
interviewee seems to be undecided with regards to his own condition, because he uses the same word in 
Danish (‘syg,’ English: ill, sick, diseased) or variations on this word (‘sygdom,’ English: disease, illness, a 
condition).   
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ing there, totally handicapped, angry and bitter that he had no legs, right.  That was not a 
very pleasant experience. 
 
She moves on quickly to explain the causes of this horrible condition: 
 
But he didn’t know…  I can’t remember that we ever had vegetables at home, because it 
wasn’t part of... […]  We had fatty food.  Fried pork and so on.  They thought that was really 
delicious, right.  And I don’t think they knew anything about vegetables and exercise being 
healthy.  I can’t remember my father being active at all.  It kept getting worse.  They didn’t 
know what to do about the diabetes.  He didn’t even get insulin. 
 
She then explains: ‘That is probably why to some people I stand out as more extreme com-
pared with others when it comes to treating my own diabetes—because I have that scary ex-
ample on my mind, right.’  This woman is not a special case.  We know of many stories re-
garding what happens if one does not take care of oneself.  People in general use these ideas of 
risks as a vehicle for working on themselves.  The thirty-seven year old man quoted above 
says that if he had been asked about his attitude towards diabetes before he was diagnosed, he 
would have said the following: 
 
It is only old people and people who eat fast food all day and stuff themselves with sweets 
and Coca Cola, who are diabetics.  It is their own fault—it is their problem.  I don’t think like 
that anymore.  But I see that attitude everywhere.  It’s because you’re fat, they say, that 
you’re a diabetic.  But they just don’t know enough about it.  And I think that’s the opinion 
in all of society: that if you’re overweight and you’ve got diabetes, then it’s your bloody own 
fault. 
 
He furthermore suggests that in order to educate people how to take proper care of them-
selves, they would have to start very early in the schools. 
 
Then they could bring in some people like me.  In five years from now, my legs will proba-
bly have been amputated—in worst case, that is.  Bring these people, who don’t have their 
legs anymore, into the schools.  And say: ‘If you don’t eat properly and stay active, you’re 
going to end up like that guy,’ right.  But I don’t know if that would help.  If I were a prima-
ry school kid, I wouldn’t listen anyway. 
 
The various educational and medical institutions as well as the practices that the diabetics 
subsequently apply to themselves make sense in light of this negative image.  The person we 
all know, but with whom we rarely identify: the mad person who does not want to care for 
him or herself, or who is incapable of doing so.  The practices around diabetes have this com-
mon denominator, and allude to this negative experience.  It constitutes the purpose of and 
the reason for, and permeates the various health education practices and the practices of self-
care. 
An obese female diabetic (age 62) during a focus group interview says the following 
when asked what the informants thought about the diabetes school: 
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I knew most of the things we were told [in the Diabetes School], I was very well aware of 
those things.  And that has only confirmed my own thoughts that ‘you know it all, so why 
don’t you just do it,’ right?  That is… I’ve used the information to kind of whip myself [Dan-
ish, meaning ‘blame myself’], that is, when I already know, why don’t I just do it?  That is, 
why don’t I just take some long walks, why don’t I run, why don’t I do more than I do?  
And why don’t I stay away from red wine, cheese and cakes—It’s a mystery!  But I don’t.  I 
haven’t properly understood that that is what I ought to do.  And you can wonder why I’m 
like that—I do, anyways—I wonder why I’m like that [laughs a bit]. 
 
I’m a mystery to myself!  Why do I have this enigmatic character?  I want to live healthily, but 
I don’t.  Why is that?  I don’t want to desire the things that I desire.  The woman blames her-
self, and she looks at herself through the eyes of society.  She stigmatises herself by internalis-
ing a cultural, economic, political, and medical exigency or norm.  She thus becomes a stranger 
to herself—‘I wonder why I’m like that.’  It is as if she characterises herself with the properties 
of ‘stultitia.’  I want to care about myself, but at the same time I can’t—I want to, but only 
fragmentarily, relatively, in a limited and unsettled manner.  Why can I not will myself 
properly? 
 
Conclusion 
The main difference between current lifestyle changes and the Hellenic and Roman practices 
of the self is that the truths guiding the Hellenic work on the self were established by an un-
questionable authority, a master.  There were, of course, competing schools of thought in the 
Hellenic and Roman world, but the individual-to-be-corrected would choose a master, and 
subsequently follow his words as truths.  The master was, undisputedly, a hegemon, but he 
operated as a counsellor, a guide, or an ‘eductor,’ i.e. someone who would ‘lend a hand’ rather 
than instructing technical principles of truth.  The truths, then, had a pragmatic function.  By 
applying the truths to the self, the very being of the subject changed.  As such, the truths and 
the master enabled this transformation to occur.  To some extent the same is probably true for 
the rules of healthy living with which the diabetics are met.  The difference, however, is the 
relationship to the master or expert.  Neo-liberal modes of government have installed a self-
limitation of power,71 i.e. modes of governing that transfer the responsibility from a state level 
to the individual.  The individual is conceived as a free agent on a market, an entrepreneurial 
self, and the health professional as a supplier of health services.  There have been several at-
tempts to situate these changes within the health care sector in a wider historical-political con-
text, for example the commodification of the public sector, the privatisation of health care, and 
in the general development of the welfare state throughout the twentieth century.  Annemarie 
Mol’s The Logic of Care. Health and the problem of patient choice from 2008 elegantly depicts how a 
logic of care has been replaced by a logic of choice, which means that the patient has no au-
thority on which to rely, to appeal to, when making decisions about healthcare and treatment.  
Making decisions about how to conduct one’s life vis-à-vis an endless flood of statistically 
generated knowledge about how different kinds of lifestyles and behaviour affect our health 
                                                 
71 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, edited by Michel Senel-
lart, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 20, 63-64. 
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and wellbeing is a complex task.  Instead of indisputable truths we therefore have health 
norms to guide our choices, norms that are constituted through an increasing awareness of 
pathological conditions.  Norms reduce the complexity of choice, and normalise behaviours.  
Caring for the lives of citizens by constructing a politics of life (Vitalpolitik)72 is achieved 
through enabling citizens to care for themselves within a welfare state that provides social care 
and security.  This is an important premise for civil society’s self-regulation.  Because of this 
self-limitation of governmental reason, this reluctance of experts to appear as authorities, 
‘eduction’ becomes an important mode of governing in liberal-democratic societies.   
Obviously the condition of stultitia, the relationship of the self to the self, which is un-
settled, fragmentary, and irresolute, is conditioned by the logic found in society, the media, in 
public health policy recommendations, and in the diabetes education activities more specifi-
cally.  The diabetics appear stultified vis-à-vis the prevalent health and lifestyle norms, and 
more specifically in light of the practices with which diabetics are supposed to practice good 
self-care.  In light of these norms and practices they at times and in various ways and degrees 
appear incomprehensible to health professionals, to people more generally, and importantly, 
to themselves.  By elaborating the concept of stultitia this, perhaps parenthetical aspect of Fou-
cault’s work, which has not been elaborated theoretically nor used empirically before, I hope 
that I have been able to shed new light on the condition, which sometimes causes health pro-
fessionals and patients alike to despair.  The aim of the paper was to elaborate the concept of 
stultitia in Foucault’s work and moreover to apply the concept by trying to make sense of the 
sometimes paradoxical experiences in a diabetes education setting. 
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